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Abstract
The mean distance between borrower and lender in the U.S. residential mortgage
market has been increasing for decades. In this paper we test whether loan sales
allow lenders to lend at greater distances. Moreover, we test whether this effect is
more pronounced for local lenders than for broad lenders. Using data on residential
mortgage origination in the U.S. between 2010 and 2019, we find that loans sold in
the same year of origination have a positive impact of the mean lending distances.
Additionally, local banks experience a stronger effect of loan sales on their lending
distance, which is decreasing as the local banks expand geographically. Our results
help explain why residential mortgage markets in the U.S. are expanding.
JEL classification: G21, L11, R31
Keywords: Lending Distance, Remote Lending, Loan Sales, Securitization, Financial Innovation,
Residential Mortgage Lending
1. Introduction
Historically, households and firms in the U.S. depended on their local lenders for credit. For this
reason, U.S. banking markets are still often spilt into local markets varying in size between one
county to roughly the size of a metropolitan statistical area (MSA). The dependence on local lenders,
also known as ’the tyranny of distance’, arose because it was much easier for lenders to obtain
and verify good-quality information from local borrowers than from remote ones. Such a local
information advantage allowed banks to offer favorable loan contracts, thereby undercutting remote
competitors (Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010; Petersen and Rajan, 2002). Remote lending was not
attractive, since there were always competitors offering loans at better rates. As a consequence,
lenders predominantly lent to their local markets, which are earmarked by short (geographic)
*I am grateful to Laura Spierdijk, and Jakob de Haan for helpful comments and suggestions.
Affiliation: Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, Faculty of Economics and Business. Address Nettel-
bosje 2, 9747 AE Groningen. m.t.van.der.plaat@rug.nl
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lending distances. For example, the mean consumer lending distance in the U.S. in 2000 was 10.48
miles (16.87 km) (Ho and Ishii, 2011). Similarly, the lending distance for small- and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) in the U.S. between 2002 and 2003 was 15.95 km (9.91 miles) (Agarwal and
Hauswald, 2010).
Lending distances, however, have been increasing during the past decades. Best documented
is the increase in small business lending distance in the U.S. since 1978 (Brevoort et al., 2010;
DeYoung et al., 2011; DeYoung et al., 2008; Granja et al., 2019; Petersen and Rajan, 2002). The
estimates vary from an increase of 15.6 miles (DeYoung et al., 2008, p. 125) to an increase of
175 miles (Granja et al., 2019, p. 3). The picture for consumer lending is less clear. On the one
hand, Loutskina and Strahan (2011) find an increase in mean consumer lending distance in the U.S.
between 1992 and 2007. On the other hand, Ho and Ishii (2011) observe a 1.6% decrease in the mean
lending distance. Using more recent data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) on U.S.
residential mortgage origination, we document an increase between 2010 and 2019. Figure 1 plots
the change in mean lending distance for each U.S. county that is part of a Metropolitan Statistical
Area (MSA). Similar to Loutskina and Strahan (2011), we observe an overall increase in the mean
lending distance of approximately 9.6%. For some counties we observe a decrease in their respective
mean lending distances, but at the MSA level these negative growth numbers disappear.
The finding of increasing lending distances is not new. In their seminal paper, Petersen and
Rajan (2002) find that small business lending distances steadily grew between 1973 and 1993. The
authors argue that lending distances have increased due to innovations in information technology.
The greater use of information technology allows banks to gather, store, and distribute more, and
different information across space and time. As a result, lenders can more easily continuously
monitor their borrowers, quickly intervene if necessary, and collect information at greater distances
without loss of information. Brevoort et al. (2010) and DeYoung et al. (2011) provide additional
proof for this conjecture.
In this paper we present an alternative explanation for this increase in lending distances, namely
loan sales. We base our alternative explanation on the paper of Frankel and Jin (2015), who model
the relationship between lending distance and securitization. Securitization refers to the process of
selling pools of legally segregated, specified, cash flows to a special purpose vehicle (SPV), which
issues securities whose principal and interest payments are exclusively linked to these pools (Gorton
and Metrick, 2013). Because we do not observe securitization, we use loan sales as a proxy instead.
Loan sales refer to the sale of a (part of a) single loan or a pool of loans, by writing a new claim
that is linked to the loan or loan pool (Gorton and Metrick, 2013). Frankel and Jin (2015) show
that securitization allows remote lenders to start lending in a local market. In their model a local
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Figure 1: Change in Lending Distance in the U.S. (2010–2019)
Notes. Only the MSAs/MDs with continuous data coverage are included. For most counties we observe an increase
in lending distance. Distance calculated based on the population-weighted centers of each county and the HMDA
database. See Section 3 for a full description of the data used.
and remote lender compete with each other for loans in a local market. Since the local lender is
located in the local market, it enjoys an informational advantage over the remote lender. Without
securitization, the local lender will outbid the remote lender for all profitable loans. Knowing this,
the remote lender does not lend. With securitization, however, both lenders can offload their loans to
the market. In this situation, the remote lender’s informational disadvantage becomes an advantage:
investors do not suspect the remote lender from only securitizing bad loans. The remote lender can
now securitize without costly signaling, allowing it to securitize all its remote loans. As a result, the
remote lender is able to compete with the local lender since it holds no poor loans on its balance
sheet, increasing its lending distance.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first paper to empirically test the predictions of Frankel
and Jin (2015). First, we test whether loan sales increase lending distances across the U.S. Second,
we test whether the effects of loan sales are similar for local lenders and lenders which are active in
multiple markets and across a large geographical area (broad lenders). We expect local lenders to
experience a greater effect of loan sales on their lending distance relative to broad lenders. Once
local lenders start using loan sales to lend in remote markets, they display a relatively large increase
in their lending distance. We test both hypotheses in the setting of the U.S. residential mortgage
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market which provides a good testing ground, since loan sales are common and lending distances
have been increasing.
We use data about the U.S. residential mortgage market between 2010 and 2019. More specifically,
we use data from the HMDA, the Statistics on Depository Institutions (SDI), the Summary of
Deposits (SOD), and various other data sources. The HMDA data provides detailed information
about residential mortgage origination across the U.S. Combining these data with data on FDIC
insured bank and thrifts produces a comprehensive dataset on yearly mortgage origination in the
U.S. The mean lending distance in our sample is approximately 808.5 km (502.3 miles), which
corresponds to about 429 minutes of travel time on a U.S. interstate. The median lending distance
is lower at 606.4 km (378.8 miles). We observe an increase in lending distance of approximately
9.6%, which is much smaller than what Petersen and Rajan (2002) find. Moreover, approximately
72% of the banks in our sample sells at least part of their loan portfolio. The mean (median) bank
sells about 58% (72.2%) of its loans. Our analysis utilizes various panel data methods, including
quantile regression analysis. This method allows us to study the heterogeneous relationship between
loan sales and lending distance.
Our analysis suggests two findings. First, we find that loan sales have a positive effect on mean
lending distance. A one percent increase in loan sales translates to an increase of about 0.33%, or
26.4 km (16.4 miles). We interpret these results as evidence that lenders offset their information
disadvantage by utilizing loan sales, thereby increasing their lending distance. Second, we find
that local lenders experience a stronger effect of loan sales on their lending distance, conditional
to observed differences, than broad lenders. Once local lenders move up the (conditional) lending
distance distribution, and become broad lenders, the effect of loan sales is diminishing.
Our paper is related to two different strands of literature. First, our paper is linked to a large
theoretical and empirical literature on loan sales and securitization. Clearly, our paper is most
closely related to Frankel and Jin (2015), and Ahn (2010) and Ahn and Breton (2014). These three
papers focus on loan sales or securitization, and loan market competition. In the setting of Frankel
and Jin (2015) banks use securitization to offset their informational disadvantage and start remote
lending. Ahn (2010) and Ahn and Breton (2014), however, show that banks can use securitization
and loan sales, respectively, to exploit their information advantage. As a result, banks are able to
extract rents from their borrowers.
Second, our paper relates to an extensive literature on lending distance. As previously mentioned,
Brevoort et al. (2010), DeYoung et al. (2011), and Petersen and Rajan (2002) find that lending
distances in the U.S. have grown between 1973–2001, and relate this to the more intense use of
technology. Other papers find increasing (DeYoung et al., 2008; Ho and Ishii, 2011), decreasing
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(Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Loutskina and Strahan, 2011), and cyclical lending distances Granja
et al. (2019), but focus on lending distance as an explanatory variable rather than as a dependent
variable. Usually through the effects of distance on information collection and processing, these
papers study a variety of phenomena. For example, they focus on the design of loan contracts
(Bellucci et al., 2019; Hollander and Verriest, 2016; Knyazeva and Knyazeva, 2012), loan pricing
(Degryse and Ongena, 2005), and loan origination (Brevoort and Hannan, 2006; Rehbein and Rother,
2020). Other studies zoom in on the relationship between lending distance and risk (DeYoung et al.,
2008; Granja et al., 2019; Loutskina and Strahan, 2011). Further studies associate lending distance
with market structure and inter-bank competition (Felici and Pagnini, 2008; Ho and Ishii, 2011),
and Islamic banking (Beck et al., 2019).
The remainder of the paper is setup as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature, and
formulates hypotheses. Next, section 3 and 4 presents the data and method, respectively. Section 5
discusses our main results, after which section 6 offers some robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
2. Hypothesis Development
In this section we develop our hypotheses with respect to the effects of loan sales on lending distance.
First, we discuss the role of information in bank lending. Then we turn to how loan sales affect the
relationship between lending distance and information.
2.1. Information and Lending Distance
The finance literature distinguishes between two types of information: hard and soft information
(Liberti and Petersen, 2019). Hard information is easily reduced to numbers, which means that
it can be collected, stored, and transmitted efficiently and electronically. The quantitative nature
of hard information makes its collection easy to automate and standardize, introducing greater
economies of scale. Soft information, on the other hand is difficult to reduce to a single parameter,
because it requires knowledge about the context to be fully understood. The qualitative nature of
soft information makes it costly to collect and difficult to transfer across time and space. The main
benefit of soft information is that it is difficult to be verified by third parties, or competitors, which
implies an information advantage for the holder.
The lending business is characterized by information asymmetries: lenders do not observe all
the information borrowers do (Boot, 2000; Diamond, 1984). Banks and thrifts approach these
information asymmetries by collecting and processing proprietary, soft information, giving them
a unique role in the financial industry. Collecting information allows banks and thrifts to screen
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and monitor clients, thereby mitigating these information asymmetries. A direct and historical
approach of screening and monitoring is relationship lending. With relationship lending, lenders
obtain proprietary, soft information from borrowers through frequent interactions over time (Agarwal
et al., 2018). As a result, borrower performance and credit availability improves (Elsas, 2005), which
reduces the overall risks of loans.
The unique role of banks and thrifts, and especially relationship lending, however, comes at a
cost: close screening and monitoring requires close proximity to the borrower (Boot, 2000). When
lending distances increase, it becomes more costly for banks to collect soft information (Hauswald and
Marquez, 2006) and Agarwal and Hauswald (2010). Consequently, banks only enjoy an informational
advantage when the borrower is relatively close.
2.2. Loan Sales, Securitization and Lending Distance
In this subsection we discuss the paper by Frankel and Jin (2015), which focuses on remote lending
and securitization. Since securitization is a latent variable, we use loan sales as a proxy instead
(see section 4.2.2). For this reason we formulate our hypotheses in terms of loan sales and not
securitization.
Loan sales provide an alternative to traditional banking and relationship banking by tackling
the information asymmetries in bank lending in a different way. Loan sales allow lenders to move
assets off their balance sheets, which has two benefits. First, the lender can de-risk since it transfers
risk to investors on the market. Second, loan sales allow lenders to transform illiquid assets to liquid
ones. These liquid assets can subsequently be invested in new, profitable assets. In contrast to
relationship banking, banks do not acquire extra information from borrowers when using loan sales.
They sell their loans to the market, transferring credit risks related to their loans to the market. See
Drucker and Puri (2009) and Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) for an extensive discussion on loan sales.
Frankel and Jin (2015) theoretically model how securitization allows lenders to lend at greater
distances.1 Securitization refers to the sale of ’securities whose principal and interest payments are
exclusively linked to a pool of legally segregated, specified, cash flows owned by a special purpose
vehicle (SPV)’ (Gorton and Metrick, 2013, p. 5). The authors consider a situation in which a
local and a remote lender compete with each other for loans. The local lender serves its own
local loan market. The remote lender lends at some distance outside the local market. The local
1The authors build on the work of Hauswald and Marquez (2006), Rajan (1992), and Sharpe
(1990), who show that without securitization, lenders with an informational advantage due to the
close proximity of borrowers have a competitive advantage over other lenders.
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lender observes an applicant’s soft and hard information, whereas the remote lender only observes
hard information. This is modeled as follows: the local lender observes the real profitability (or
creditworthiness) of each loan applicant. The remote lender only observes the loan applicant’s credit
score, which is an imperfect representation of the applicant’s profitability. As a consequence, the
local lender enjoys an informational advantage in its local market.
In a situation without securitization, the local lender always outbids the remote lender. The
local lender offers the profitable applicants a competitive loan rate, which is slightly lower than
the loan rate of remote lender, and does not serve the unprofitable applicants. Because the remote
lender knows the local lender will serve all profitable applicants, it decides not to make any offers.
In a situation in which both lenders can securitize their loans, ignorance is bliss for the remote
lender. Since the local lender observes the profitability of the applicants, he has the incentive to
securitize only the unprofitable applicants. Investors market know this, and do not buy the local
lender’s securities unless the local lender signals asset quality, which is costly. Because the remote
lender does not exactly know the profitability of the applicants, he securitizes all its loans, which he
is able to do without costly signaling. As a result, the remote lender can more than offset his costs
of his informational disadvantage, and starts lending.
Based on Frankel and Jin’s predictions we formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Loan sales allow lenders to lend at greater geographical distances.
In Frankel and Jin’s framework, the local lender also benefits from securitization, albeit less, for
it incurs high signaling costs and therefore less securitization, which suggests parameter heterogeneity.
When the local lender decides to start lending in a remote market, he incurs low signaling costs
for these specific loans. As mentioned before, the lender securitizes all remote loans. As a result,
the local lender increases loans securitized as well as lending distance. In contrast, when a lender
already provides credit to many remote markets, lending to a new remote market only fractionally
increases relative lending distance and loans securitized. The marginal effect of securitization on
physical lending distance, therefore, is diminishing in the overall lending distance of the lender. We,
therefore formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 (H2). The marginal effect of loan sales on physical lending distance diminishes in
the overall lending distance of a lender.
3. Data
We obtain our data from multiple different sources. For all loan-level information we use the data
from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). For all information about FDIC insured financial
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institutions and their branches we use the Statistics on Depository Institutions (SDI) and the
Summary of Deposits (SOD), respectively, from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
For other county-level information we use data from the US Census Bureau and the National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER). We only include FDIC-insured thrifts and banks. See Table A1 for
a overview of which data sources are used for which variables.
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Data For loan-level data, we use the mortgage loan
application register from the HMDA between 2010 and 2017. The HMDA requires all eligible
financial institutions in the U.S. to maintain, report, and publicly disclose loan-level information
about their residential mortgage lending activities.2 The data provide information about how lenders
are serving the housing needs of U.S. residents (Bhutta et al., 2017). The data cover approximately
90% of all originated mortgages in the U.S. (Dell’ariccia et al., 2012), and contain extensive coverage
on sold and held mortgages. The data is of yearly frequency.
Following Bikker et al. (2012), Ho and Ishii (2011), and Müller and Noth (2018), we define a
banking market to be a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) or a metropolitan division (MD). Since
the HMDA coverage of rural counties is sparse, we cannot ensure continuous data coverage, and
exclude all loans originated outside of MSAs and MDs. We include only loans with the purpose of
home purchase. Furthermore, we exclude all loans with missing values in the variables for MSA/MD,
loan amount and applicant income, respectively.
For each reporting institution we aggregate the loans at the MSA/MD-level in each year. Using
the HMDA lender file (a.k.a. ’the Avery file’, cf. Bhutta et al. (2017)) we match the HMDA data
with the other sources of data.
The HMDA data provide detailed information about residential mortgage origination in the
U.S., but is not without limitations. All mortgage-originating organizations that fall below a certain
threshold are not in the data. Even though these organizations originate only a small fraction of
the mortgages, they might play an important role in local markets. Moreover, we do not observe
the date of origination, the value of collateral, the interest rate, the exact location of the borrower
and lending branch, credit score, and whether the loan is conforming or not. We overcome most of
these limitations by combining the HMDA data with data from other sources about lenders and
U.S. counties. Most importantly, however, we cannot track the loans through time. As a result, we
2An institution reports to the HMDA if 1) it is a bank, credit union, or savings association, 2) its
total assets exceed the coverage threshold ($39 million in 2010), 3) it has a home or branch in an MSA,
and 4) it has originated at least one residential loan secured by a first lien on a one-to-four-family
dwelling.
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miss loans sold in a year that it is not their origination year. Loans originated in a specific year
and sold in the next year are tagged as not sold in the HMDA data. This measurement error, or
attenuation bias, might lead to an underestimation of the effects of loan sales on lending distance.
Avery et al. (2007) acknowledge this problem, but argue that this bias is likely to be small. Many
end-of-year applications, the argument goes, are carried over into the following reporting year. As a
result, end-of-year applications are low and start-of-year applications are high. For most lenders,
the difference in the number of applications will balance out. For this reason, we do not correct for
attenuation.
Statistics on Depository Institutions For lender-level information, we use the year-end
SDI. The SDI contain information about income statement, balance sheet, and off-balance sheet
items for all FDIC-insured institutions.
We match the SDI data with the HMDA data via the HMDA lender file on the FDIC-certificate
number. Furthermore, we exclude all institutions with missing or zero values for total assets, and
number of employees.
Summary of Deposits The SOD is a mid-year, annual survey of branch offices for FDIC-
insured institutions. We only use location information of the branches. We match the SOD data
with the SDI data on FDIC-certificate number.
Other County-level Data For all other county-level data we use the following databases.
First, we use the Centers of Population from the US Census Bureau to get the population-weighted
geographic centers of all U.S. counties. We use the NBER County Distance Database to get the
unweighted geographic centers of all U.S. counties, which we use as robustness test. Second, we use
the Presence and Types of Internet in Household data from the US Census Bureau to get information
about the broadband internet subscriptions per U.S. county. The dataset covers a large share of
the U.S. counties and starts in 2013 and ends in 2018. Third, we use Population Estimates from
the US Census Bureau, and the State-Based Files from the Census Bureau to calculate the county
population density. We match each county-level dataset with the HMDA data and SDI data on
MSA/MD code.
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3.1. Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the full sample (2010–2019). The full sample has 267,613
observations, and includes 430 and 3,826 unique MSAs and lenders, respectively. All variables
except Loan Sales, Subprime, Bank, Internet, and HHI are in logs. Loan Sales, Subprime, Bank,
and Internet are fractions, and HHI is the Hirschman-Herfindahl index. For exposition purposes, we
transform the distance variables back to real numbers.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean Median S.E.
Dependent Variable
Distance (pop. weighted; log) 5.0909 6.4092 2.8083
Distance (CDD; log) 4.5792 5.3379 2.7324
Distance (pop. weighted; km) 808.367 606.4061 897.66
Distance (CDD; km) 613.4097 207.0671 847.6686
Loan Sales Variables
Loan Sales 0.5803 0.7222 0.4212
LS GSE 0.273 0.0 0.3777
LS Private 0.34 0.0 0.4151
Securitization 0.0101 0.0 0.0875
Loan Control Variables
LTI 1.0933 1.1242 0.3159
Loan Value 5.2232 5.204 0.6544
Income 4.6374 4.5395 0.6582
Subprime 0.1405 0.0 0.2853
Lender Control Variables
Size 15.1641 14.4055 2.6377
Employees 6.5926 6.0707 2.3026
Branches 3.3311 2.6391 2.2144
Bank 0.5308 1.0 0.4991
MSA Control Variables
Internet 0.7558 0.7607 0.09
Density 0.2592 0.2574 0.0634
Population 5.1142 5.0693 1.0883
MFI 11.103 11.0868 0.1882





Notes. All variables are in logs except Loan Sales, Subprime, Bank, Internet, and HHI. For a description of all
variables see subsection 4.2 and Table A1.
The log mean (median) population-weighted lending distance is 5.09 (6.41), which translates to
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approximately 808.4 km (606.4 km), or 502.3 miles (376.8 miles). On a US interstate, 808.4 km
(606.4 km) corresponds to about 429 minutes (322 minutes) of travel time at 113 kph (70 mph). The
mean and median non-population-weighted lending distance is slightly shorter at 613.4 km (381.2
miles) and 207.1 km (128.7 miles), respectively. Between 2019 and 2010 the lending distance has
increased by approximately 9.6% at a continuous rate. This increase in lending distance is similar
to the findings of Loutskina (2011), but much smaller than what Petersen and Rajan (2002) find.
In about 15% of our sample the borrower and lender are located in the same county. In all other
cases, the lender and the borrower are not in the same county. The maximum population-weighted
lending distance is 7158 km (4447.9 miles), which corresponds to the (straight-line) distance between
Tampa, FL and Honolulu, HI.
Approximately 72% of lenders in our sample sell at least part of their loan portfolio. On average
a lender sells 58% of his loans (the median is 72.2%). Of these sales, approximately 47% are sold to
government-sponsored entities (GSEs), 59% to other private parties, and 2% are privately securitized
(not displayed in Table 1).
With respect to loan characteristics, the mean (median) value of a loan is approximately 5.2232
(5.204), and is about 1.1 times larger than the applicant income. With 32.8%, relatively few loans in
our sample are characterized as subprime loans. Similar to Purnanandam (2011), we characterize a
loan as subprime when the reported loan spreads are above 3% for first-security loans and above 5%
for all junior security loans. The mean population-weighted distance for these loans is smaller than
the overall mean population-weighted distance with about 617.5 km (383.7 miles; not displayed in
the Table).
Approximately 53% of the lenders in our samples are commercial banks; the others are thrifts.
The average lender has total assets with a value of about 15.2. In U.S. dollars this corresponds
to 112.3 million. Moreover, the average (median) lender has 13,622 (432) employees and 419 (13)
branches.
Last, on average about 76% of the households in our sample have a broadband internet connection.
In addition, the average MSA has 0.26 branches per 10.000 inhabitants, which translates to one
branch per 38,580 inhabitants. Moreover, an average MSA has a branch-based Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index of about 8%, and on average 5 inhabitants per square kilometer (in logs), or approximately
327 inhabitants per square kilometer.
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4. Model Specification
In this section, we discuss our modeling setup. First, we introduce our benchmark model and
our quantile regression model. Second, we describe how we construct the variables used in the
benchmark and quantile regression model.
4.1. Model Description
Consider the following model:
Distanceijt = βLSijt +Xijtγ + εijt, (1)
where Distanceijt is the natural logarithm of one plus the average lending distance of lender i in
MSA j in year t. LSijt measures the fraction of loans of lender i in MSA j in year t are sold or
securitized. Xijt is a vector of control variables.
4.1.1. The Benchmark Model
In our benchmark model we estimate equation (1) on the entire dataset, spanning the years 2010
through 2019. We include lender and MSA-year fixed effects (εijt = αi + δjt + uijt). The former
controls for heterogeneity among lenders. The MSA-year fixed effects absorb all market-wide
time-specific effects. We include MSA-year fixed effects since each banking market could have its
own time trend. Furthermore, we include variables to control for loan-specific and MSA-specific
characteristics (Xijt = [V ijt,W it]), and cluster the standard errors on the MSA-level.
4.1.2. Quantile Regression model
Next to the benchmark model, we estimate equation (1) with a quantile regression model. Quantile
regression concerns the estimation of conditional quantiles, which allows us to study the factors that
influence the 100τ% farthest lending distance conditional to a set of covariates, where τ ∈ (0, 1). As
a result, quantile regression yields a set of estimates covering the range from short to great lending
distances. With this approach we can test H2 after controlling for observed differences.
We pool the model, and do not include fixed effects in the quantile regression model, since there
is no general transformation that can suitably eliminate fixed effects. We could impose relatively
strict conditions on one of the dimensions to correct for fixed effects. The costs of such conditions
probably outweigh the efficiency of the pooled model. As a result we need to include MSA-specific
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control variables alongside loan-specific and MSA-specific control variables Xijt = [V ijt,W it,Zjt]).
As in the benchmark model, we use the full dataset to estimate the quantile regressions.
To estimate the quantile regressions we us an iterative re-weighted least squares algorithm
implemented in statsmodels’ QuantReg for Python.3 We obtain estimates for the covariance matrices
with a kernel density estimator (Greene, 2007). We estimate equation (1) for each percentile in the
0–1 range.
4.2. Variable Description
In this subsection we describe how we construct our dependent variable, lending distance, and our
variable of interest, loan sales. Additionally, we show how we construct our control variables and
discuss their expected sign.
4.2.1. Lending Distance
Our dependent variable measures the distance between a mortgage borrower and a mortgage lender.
Suppose lender i lends to borrower k in MSA j via its branch b. The distance between borrower
k and lender i is the straight-line distance between the (geographic) location of the borrower and
the branch. We observe in which county the borrower resides, we observe the resident county of all
branches of each lender, and we observe from which lender borrower k borrows. We do not, however,
observe from which branch of lender i borrower k borrows.
Following Brevoort and Hannan (2006) and Ho and Ishii (2011), we assume that borrower k
borrows from the closest branch of lender i. For each borrower-lender pair {ik} we can calculate the
minimum distance between borrower k and branch b of lender i. Then, for some distance operator
d(·) the minimum distance for borrower-lender pair {ik} is:




b ), b = 1, 2, ..., B,
where Dik is the minimum distance for borrower-lender pair {ik}, Lk is the location of borrower
k, and L
(i)
b is the location of branch b of lender i. For d(·) we use a haversine formula, where the
geographic location is measured by the respective latitude and longitude. We then aggregate Dik on
lender and MSA level.
The location of both the borrowers and branches are at the county-level. For each county, we
assign latitudes and longitudes, which we then use to calculate lending distance. For our benchmark
3See Koenker (2005) for the iterative re-weighted least squares algorithm.
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model and quantile regression we use population-weighted latitudes and longitudes from the US
Census Bureau. As a robustness check, we use the NBER County Distance Database, which is based
on the centroids of U.S. counties by the US Census Bureau, and is not corrected for population
density.
4.2.2. Loan Sales
The data do not allow us to observe securitization directly, it only allows us to observe the purchaser
of a specific loan. Consequently we use loan sales as a proxy. We believe loan sales are a good proxy
for securitization for two reasons. First, both loan sales and securitization were designed to transfer
risks off the balance sheet of a lender. Second, both were designed to transform illiquid asset into
liquid assets. The main differences between them is that securitization alters the patterns of cash
flows, and converts the loan pools into marketable securities (Greenbaum et al., 2019). These asset
transformations, however, mainly affect the marketability of the underlying assets, and not so much
the risk transferring capability of securitization. A practical benefit of using loan sales with respect
to securitzation is that loan sales are much more common than securitization.
For each loan in the HMDA data we observe whether the loan is sold to a GSE, sold to a third
party, sold to a SPV (private securitization), or not sold by the lender. The HMDA only logs a loan
as sold when it is originated and sold in the same year. We are confident the HMDA captures most
loan sale activity, since the average time between loan origination and loan sale is about 29 days
(Rosen, 2011).
We calculate the share of loans sold by lender i in MSA j at time t by dividing the number of
loans sold by the total number of loans. We consider a loan sold, when the loan is sold to either a
GSE, private party, or a SPV.
4.2.3. Other Control Variables
Table 2 presents the expected sign of each control variable, including a short explanation. In our
benchmark model, we control for loan-specific and MSA-specific characteristics. The loan-specific
characteristics capture the loan value and the riskiness of a loan, captured by loan-to-income (LTI),
borrower income, and subprime. In general, we expect riskier loans to be originated closer to
the lender, and more valuable loans to attract lenders at a greater distance. The lender-specific
characteristics capture whether the lender is a bank, the size and geographic reach of the lender.
The latter is proxied by the number of employees and branches, respectively. We expect large banks
with many employees and branches to be more likely to lend at greater distances.
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Since we do not include any fixed effects in our quantile regressions, we need to control for
MSA-specific characteristics, such as lending competition, the attractiveness of the market, and the
usage of internet banking. We capture lending competition by the number of branches in a MSA
corrected for MSA population (Density) and a branch-based Herfindahl-Hirschman index. To proxy
market attractiveness, we use MSA population and MSA median family income (MFI). The usage of
internet banking is proxied by the fraction of households having a broadband internet subscription
of any kind. In general, we expect that rich, populous MSAs have a higher probability of attracting
remote lenders. MSAs with high levels of competition are more likely to have short lending distances.
Lastly, we expect internet banking to lead to greater lending distance (cf. Brevoort et al. (2010),
DeYoung et al. (2011), and Petersen and Rajan (2002)). An overview of the construction of these
variables can be found in Table A1, which includes the data sources we use per variable.
5. Empirical Results
In this section we present the results of our benchmark model and quantile regression model.
5.1. Benchmark Model
Table 3 displays the results of our benchmark model. Our estimates suggest that loan sales have
a positive impact on the average lending distance of a lender. We find a positive and significant
estimate for loan sales of about 0.33. This estimate is economically significant as well. When the
average lender decides to sell 10% more loans in the year of origination, lending distance increases
by about 3.3%, or 26.4 km (16.4 miles). We can interpret these results as evidence in support of our
first hypothesis (H1), albeit only for loans sold in the same year of origination.
The coefficients of most control variables are significant and have the expected signs. The
coefficients of loan control variables Loan Value, Income and Subprime are significant and positive.
Economically, Income has a similar impact on the lending distance as loan sales. Loan Value,
however, has a stronger economic effect: a 10% in loan value corresponds to an increase in average
lending distance of about 44.4 km (27.6). The economic effect of excess loan rates (our Subprime
variable) is only small. The coefficients of the lender control variables Size and Branch are significant
with the expected positive and negative signs, respectively. Hence when lenders increase in size,
their lending distance increases as well. The economic effect of lender size on lending distance,
though, is relatively small. The economic effect of adding additional branches is stronger. When an
average lender adds one extra branch (an increase of 0.24%) lending distance decreases with 639
meters (0.4 miles).
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Table 2: Control Variables and Their Expected Signs
Variable Exp. Sign Explanation Source
Loan Control Variables (V ijt)
LTI - Due to information asymmetries, risky loans are less likely to be
originated at greater distances.
DeYoung et al. (2011)
Loan Value + The greater the loan value, the greater the probability that a lender
will lend at a distance.
Berger et al. (2005)
Income + Higher income signals lower credit risk, and hence the higher the
income, the greater the lending distance.
DeYoung et al. (2008) and
Loutskina and Strahan (2011)
Subprime - Captures loans with excess loan rates, lenders are more likely to
charge higher loan rates at greater distances.
Agarwal and Hauswald (2010)
and Purnanandam (2011)
Lender Control Variables (W it)
Size + The more intense use of hard information makes large lender’s lend-
ing technology less distance dependent.
Berger et al. (2005)
Employees - Is a proxy for personal communication. The more employees a
lender has, the more personal contact is possible.
Petersen and Rajan (2002)
Branches - Captures the geographical reach of a lender. The more branches a
lender has, the more likely it is to have a branch relatively close to
the lender.
Berger et al. (2005)
Bank - Banks are often more closely located to their borrowers than non-
banks.
Petersen and Rajan (2002)
MSA Control Variables (Zjt)
Internet + Internet banking improves information collection and storing,
which allows lenders to collect information at greater distances.
Brevoort et al. (2010), DeY-
oung et al. (2011), and Pe-
tersen and Rajan (2002)
Density - Lenders in areas with a high density of lenders are more likely to
have a short lending distance.
Loutskina and Strahan (2011)
and Petersen and Rajan (2002)
Population - Highly population dense MSAs are more likely to have shorted lend-
ing distances. lenders.
Berger et al. (2005), Felici and
Pagnini (2008), and Keys et al.
(2010)
MFI + High income markets are more attractive to remote lenders.
HHI - The more concentrated the lending industry, the closer lenders are
to their clients.
Berger et al. (2005), DeY-
oung et al. (2011), Felici and
Pagnini (2008), and Knyazeva
and Knyazeva (2012)
The coefficient of the variable Employees is significant, but does not have the expected sign. We
find an estimate of 0.095, suggesting that the number of employees has a positive effect on lending
distance. Even though the estimate is positive, it is relatively small. An increase of employees of
10% leads to an increase in average lending distance of about 7.7 km (4.8 miles). An alternative
explanation might be that the variable Employees captures the size of the lender. In that case, an
increase in employees is not a proxy for personal communication, but a proxy for lender size, so that
the positive sign of Employees is as expected.
The fit of our model does not appear particularly good, with an adjusted R2 of 0.358. However,
other studies using similar datasets yield similar fits. For example, using HMDA-data and a similar
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Notes. P-value in parentheses. LTI = loan-to-income ratio. The model is estimated with clustered standard errors
on the MSA-level.
fixed-effects setup, Müller and Noth (2018) find a (within) R2 in the range 0.0022–0.0151.
5.2. Quantile Regression
Figure 2 displays the quantile regression estimates of loan sales. We limit our discussion to the
estimates of our variable of interest, loan sales. The model is estimated with the full set of control
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variables, and includes robust standard errors.4
Before we interpret the estimates, we briefly explain how to read Figure 2. The Figure displays
the impact of our loan sales variable on the range of conditional quantiles of lending distance. We
start with the lowest quantile on the left, and end with the top quantile on the right. The solid
curve and the blue shaded area are the quantile regression parameter estimates and 95% confidence
bounds, respectively. We have added the pooled OLS parameter estimates (solid black line), and
the 95% confidence bound (dashed black lines) as a way to compare the quantile regression and
OLS estimates.
Figure 2: Estimated Quantile Regression Coefficient for Loan Sales
Notes. The figure shows the impact of loan sales on the distribution of the physical lending distance of the quantile
conditional on all control variables (solid curve) and 95% confidence bounds (light-shaded area). The model is
estimated on the full sample with loan, lender, and MSA control variables. The estimation results are based on an
iterative re-weighted least squares algorithm implemented in statsmodels’ QuantReg package in Python. In addition,
we have plotted the ordinary least squares coefficients (solid black line) and their 95% confidence bounds (dashed
black lines) obtained from our main model for visual comparison.
The estimates of our loan sale variable display a bell-curve shape. Much of the bell curve falls
outside the OLS 95% confidence bounds, indicating severe parameter heterogeneity. Starting at zero,
the estimates for loan sales rapidly increase until the peak at the 21st percentile. The estimates
then rapidly decrease, but never reach zero again. At the peak, a 10% increase in loan sales leads to
an increase of approximately 31.5% in lending distance. Similarly, at the median a 10% increase in
4The information for all other variables in the model are available upon request.
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loan sales leads to an increase of 7.1%. At the 80% percentile the effects of a 10% increase in loan
sales is only 0.18%.
We can interpret the quantile regression results as follows. Local lenders, i.e. lenders at the
lower end of the conditional lending distance distribution, experience a strong effect of loan sales on
their lending distance after controlling for observed differences. Broad lenders at the upper end of
the conditional lending distance distribution, on the other hand, experience a much less pronounce
effect on their lending distance. When local lenders move towards broad lenders, i.e. they move
up on the conditional lending distance distribution, the effects of loan sales on lending distance
gradually become smaller. This diminishing marginal effect holds true from the 20% percentile and
up. Our results therefore provide evidence for our second hypothesis (H2), but only for the higher
percentiles and conditional to other observables.
The estimates for the percentiles below the 20% percentiles could be explained by zooming in
on the banking markets. A banking market the size of an MSA often consists of multiple counties.
When a lender only lends in one county its average lending distance is by construction zero. That
lender then can start lending to the neighboring county, which is in the same MSA. As a result,
it sees its average lending distance increase while remaining in the same market. Since the lender
remains in the same market, it has at most only a small information disadvantage. As a result, it
has hardly any informational disadvantage to displace with loan sales. In summary: lenders below
the 20% percentiles, might not need loan sales to offset their information disadvantage, since they
lend in the same banking market.
6. Robustness Checks
In this section we perform several robustness checks. The results of these robustness check are
shown in Table 4. We focus on the robustness of Loan Sales and highlight the control variables
when their estimates qualitatively diverge from those of our benchmark model.
6.1. Internet Banking
It is possible that our variable for loan sales actually captures how much technology lenders use, and
hence provide support of the hypothesis of Petersen and Rajan (2002) on the effect of technology
on lending distance. To rule this out, we add a variable for internet banking, Internet. We proxy
internet banking by the percentage of people in a MSA having a broadband internet subscription of
any sort. We assume that individuals with a broadband internet subscription are more tech-savvy
than individuals without such a subscription. Individuals with more knowledge and experience with
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Table 4: Robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Loan Sales 0.2516 0.2473 0.3858 1.3033









LTI -0.1175 -0.1343 -0.2425 -0.2189 -0.4482
(0.2627) (0.1931) (0.0014) (0.0038) (0.0005)
Loan Value 0.5136 0.5072 0.498 0.4929 0.9407
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Income 0.4451 0.4297 0.2753 0.286 0.0332
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.6366)
Subprime 0.1063 0.1223 0.0932 0.1478 0.4179
(0.0165) (0.0052) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Size 0.0505 -0.063 -0.0425 -0.034 -0.0509
(0.1384) (0.0979) (0.1092) (0.1982) (0.0001)
Employees 0.3336 0.3579 0.3647 0.3512 0.4697
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Branches 0.0069 -0.0007 -0.3569 -0.3599 -0.7194
(0.7625) (0.9748) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Bank 0.109 0.1036 -0.0114 -0.0066 0.0112
(0.0016) (0.0031) (0.7052) (0.8246) (0.7963)
Density -3.0131 -2.6939 -3.7425
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Population -0.0905 -0.095 -0.1647
(0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0000)
MFI -0.6359 -1.1754 0.4048
(0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0113)
HHI -0.3839 -0.2957 -0.0779
(0.1227) (0.1968) (0.8149)
Observations 148478 148478 267613 267613 267613
Adj. R2 0.0596 0.0624 0.039 0.038 0.2007
Depvar mean 0 0 0 0 5.0909
Depvar median 0.2832 0.2832 0.2501 0.2501 6.4092









MSAs/MDs 415 415 430 430 430
Lenders 3450 3450 3826 3826 3826
Notes. P-value in parentheses. All models are estimated with clustered standard errors on the MSA-level. Model
(5) is estimated with an intercept.
personal computers, internet, hand-held devices, etc., are more likely to adopt internet banking (cf.
Corrocher (2006) and Kim et al. (2005)).
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Since Internet does not vary across the lender-dimension, we estimate the model with year and
lender fixed effects. We estimate the model with and without Internet so that we can compare the
models. Furthermore, we estimate the models with the full set of control variables, and on a reduced
sample because Internet does not cover all years. The reduced sample is from 2013 to 2018.
Columns (1) and (2) contain the estimates of the models without and with Internet, respectively.
The estimates for Loan Sales in the column (1) are significant, positive, and slightly lower than
our benchmark estimates. When we add Internet (column (2)), the coefficient of Loan Sales hardly
changes and remains significant. Interestingly, we also find a significant and positive estimate
for Internet, suggesting that internet banking allows banks to lend at greater distance. Since
the estimates of Loan Sales and Internet are both significant, we conclude these effects happen
concurrently.
In both columns, the coefficient of MFI is significant but have an unexpected sign. As a result,
these estimates suggest that lending distance for wealthy MSAs, measured by median family income,
is shorter than for less-wealthy MSAs.
6.2. Split Loan Sales
In our benchmark model, we aggregate all types of loan sales and securitization into one measure.
The effects we find, however, might be driven by a particular type of loan sales. For this reason
we split Loan Sales into three distinct categories: loan sales to government-sponsored enterprises
(GSEs), loan sales to private parties, and private securitization. The estimation is similar to the
benchmark model: we estimate the model on the full sample (2010–2019), with lender and MSA-year
fixed effects.
Column (3) displays the results of splitting Loan Sales. For all three categories we find significant
and positive coefficients. Next, we test whether the coefficients differ significantly. We use a Wald
test, and jointly test whether βGSE = βPrivate and βPrivate = βSecuritization. We reject this test at
the 1%-level, and conclude that the coefficients differ significantly. Hence, our benchmark results are
for an important part driven by securitization. Loan sales to GSEs have the least impact on lending
distance. All three categories, however, have a positive impact on the average lending distance of a
lender.
The impact of securitization on lending distance appears to be the strongest of the three. This
interpretation, however, is not without difficulties. Private securitization in the U.S. is done by
a select group of large banks. The size of these banks makes them likely to have great lending
distances regardless of their securitization activities. It is therefore possible that Securitization
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captures, at least in part, the size of this group of banks.
6.3. County Centroid Lending Distance
As a third robustness test we use non-population weighted county centroids to calculate lending
distances. Our benchmark results could be sensitive to the way we have calculated lending distances.
The estimation procedure is identical to our benchmark model.
We find a significant and positive estimate for Loan Sales (see columns (4)). The estimated
coefficient is slightly higher than in the benchmark model at 0.3858, which indicates that our results
are robust to a different specification of lending distance.
6.4. OLS
Last, we estimate the benchmark model without fixed effects. As mentioned earlier, adding complex
fixed effects could remove much of the variation in the data. If the unobserved heterogeneity is
uncorrelated with the error term, OLS provides consistent results.
Column (5) contains the estimates of the OLS model. The estimated coefficient for Loan Sales
is significant and positive, but is much higher than the benchmark result at 1.3033, which makes
a big difference for the economic significance. The OLS estimate for Loan Sales indicates that a
10% increase in loan sales corresponds to an increase in lending distance of approximately 105.4
km (65.5 miles). Hence, the effects of loan sales on lending distance could be stronger than initially
estimated in our benchmark model. At least part of the variation in the data has been lost due to
the use fixed effects.
The coefficients of the control variables Size and Bank are significant, but have an unexpected
sign. The estimates suggest that when lenders increase in size, their lending distance decreases.
Similarly, banks have a larger lending distances. However, the estimate coefficients, -0.0509 and
0.0112, respectively, are so small, that their economic significance is low.
7. Conclusions
Lending distances in the U.S. residential mortgage market have been increasing in the past few
decades. In this paper we argued this is increase due to the use of loan sales in the banking industry.
Loan sales allow lenders to offset their informational disadvantage when lending to remote markets.
As a consequence, loan sales facilitate lending at greater distances. The effects of loan sales on
lending distance diminishes in the average lending distance of a lender: locals lenders experience a
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greater effect than broad lenders.
Using data on the U.S. residential mortgage origination between 2010–2019, we found that
loan sales stimulate lending at greater distances. An increase of 10% in loan sales translates to
an increase of 26.4 km (16.4 miles) in lending distance for the average lender. As we only observe
loan sales that occur in the same year of origination as lending, our results probably underestimate
the effects of loan sales on lending distance. In addition, we found that local banks experience a
stronger effect of loan sales on their lending distance than broad banks, conditional on observed
differences. When local lenders become broad lenders, the marginal effect of loan sales gradually
becomes smaller. Our results are robust to several sensitivity checks.
The use of loan sales and the subsequent geographic expansion is not without risk. Loan
sales do not decrease the overall risk in the system, they merely transfer risk across the system.
The information disadvantage of remote lender vis-à-vis the local lender does not disappear. All
else equal, remote loans are still riskier than local loans, because they are based on lower-quality
information. Loan sales allow these risky loans to flow to investors with a larger risk appetite than
the remote lender. Loan sales do not reduce the information asymmetry between borrower and
lender, which are probably even greater in small-business lending where soft information is much
more important than in residential mortgage lending. In fact, loan sales most likely increase the
total risk in the system by allowing lending at greater distances, which implies greater informational
disadvantages for the lender and riskier loans. Whether this is the case is for future research to
decide. The effects of loan sales on risk are probably more pronounced when we include how loan
sales, and especially securitization, affect screening, monitoring, and risk taking by lenders.
Since we focus on lending distance, we cannot make any predictions about inter-bank competition.
It is very likely, however, that growing lending distances impact inter-bank competition. In fact,
Frankel and Jin predict that securitization leads to more intense lending competition. Other papers
argue the other way around, and predict the securitization and loan sales could cushion competition
by allowing banks to ask higher loan rates. Future research might study these predictions empirically.
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Table A1: Variable Description, Source and Construction







Coordinates lender: US Census
Bureau, Centers of Population;
Summary of Deposits (SOD)




where d is the
geographical distance





Log minimum distance be-
tween lender and borrower




Percentage of loans sold














Loan Value Log of the value of the loan MSA-lender-year HMDA ln(loan valueijt + 1)
Income Log of the incomce of the
borrower
MSA-lender-year HMDA ln(incomeijt + 1)






Size Log of the total assets of
the lender
Lender-year Statistics on Depository Insti-
tutions (SDI)
ln(TAit)
Employees Log of employees per
lender
Lender-year SDI ln(#employeesit + 1)
Branches Log of the number of
branches per lender
Lender-year SOD ln(#branchesit + 1)
Bank Dummy indicating
whether the lender is
a bank
Lender-year SDI 1 if bankit, else 0
MSA Control Variables
Internet Percentage of people with
a broadband internet sub-
scription
MSA-year US Census Bureau, presence




Density Log of the number of
branches per MSA, popula-
tion weighted (per 10,000
inhabitants)








Population Log of the number of
people per square-km per
MSA
MSA-year US Census Bureau, population





MFI Log of the median family
income per MSA
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